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Abstract: 
Within the framework of a dynamic Computable General Equilibrium model this pa-
per analyses the impact of trade restrictions on regional rates of return on capital, mar-
ginal costs of abatement and optimal climate policy. It will be shown that regional dif-
ferences both in marginal costs of abatement and in the marginal productivity of capi-
tal are driven by market imperfection. With restrictions on international trade, the in-
dustrialized countries of the North exhibit higher marginal costs of abatement and a 
lower marginal productivity of capital than the developing nations of the South. Free 
trade not only in carbon emission rights but also in capital increases conventional wel-
fare but stimulates carbon dioxide emissions which are not completely offset by effi-
ciency gains in abatement. Nevertheless, depending upon the choice of the discount 
rate some kind of an invariance result is observed. 
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1. Introduction 
 
International agreements on greenhouse gas abatement must provide answers to at least two 
questions: (1) where to abate, and, (2) by how much to abate greenhouse gas emissions? From 
an economic viewpoint the response to these questions seems almost obvious. Climate change 
policy should lead to a pareto-efficient internalization of external effects of global warming. 
Greenhouse gas abatement should primarily take place where costs are lowest, and, to assure 
efficiency, carbon emission permits should be tradable on open international markets. 
These propositions, however, are hardly expected to apply in reality. Since the OECD 
countries as well as the former Soviet Union are responsible for the majority of both current 
and past carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, developing countries insist that the industrialized 
nations should take moral responsibility by reducing their CO2 emissions. In particular, they 
require that the OECD countries should not be allowed to reduce their abatement duties 
through trading carbon emission rights. 
The industrialized nations, however, counter that marginal costs of greenhouse gas 
abatement are typically lower in the developing than in the industrialized regions of the world, 
and that an efficient solution of the global climate problem requires the equalization of mar-
ginal costs of abatement (see Weyant, 1997). In their view, curbing greenhouse gas emissions 
is also to be initiated in the developing countries.  
In some way the Kyoto Protocol reflects both views. The so-called ANNEX 1 parties 
which includes the OECD countries have agreed to abate their carbon emissions first. Addi-
tionally, they are at least in principle allowed to trade carbon emission rights among them-
selves and to opt for joint implementation. By this ANNEX 1 countries might take advantage 
of low cost abatement potentials. 
It is widely accepted among economists that differences in marginal costs of abate-
ment incur efficiency losses. Chichilnisky and Heal (1994), however, have questioned the 
economists' typical presumption that marginal costs of abatement have to be identical for an 
pareto-efficient solution of the global climate problem. Using a static framework they 
showed: Provided, the global climate is viewed as public good, and provided neither capital 
nor carbon emission permits are traded on open international markets, identical marginal costs 
of abatement will be observed only if marginal utilities of income are equated across coun-
tries.  
In our view, the assumption that there is no homogeneous commodity traded on an 
open international market is crucial for at least three reasons. First, if there is free interna-
tional trade, then any tradable can play the role of a international numeraire. This, however, 
requires that the rates of return on capital are identical in all regions. For, if there were differ-
ences, then arbitrage and capital movements would equalize them almost immediately (see 
Manne and Rutherford, 1994). 
Second, a no-free-trade assumption is in contrast to most of the regionally disaggre-
gated impact models of global climate change. For example, in both RICE (see Nordhaus and 
Yang, 1996) and MERGE (see Manne and Richels, 1995), pareto-optimal abatement policies 
are achieved through “where” and “when” flexibility. That is, the abatement of greenhouse 
gases is determined in each region and in each time period by trading emission rights as ho-
mogeneous commodities on open international markets. 
 Finally, empirical evidence is inconsistent with a no-trade hypothesis as well as the 
fiction of a free-trade world economy. Recently, Gordon and Bovenberg (1996) have recon-
firmed the findings of Feldstein and Horioka (1980) that capital is quite immobile internation-
ally: On one hand, additional savings in one country will increase almost a dollar-for-dollar 
investment in just that country. On the other, there are regional differentials in real interest 
rates what provides further evidence of restrictions on international capital mobility. 
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Greenhouse gas abatement can be viewed as an alternative to conventional capital 
formation. Somehow, the society must agree on how to split its limited resources between 
investment in region-specific physical capital and global investment in environmental capital. 
Since restrictions on international trade in capital or in carbon emission rights can affect re-
gional investment decisions, it might be expected that significant interregional differences in 
rates of return could affect global climate policy decisions. Analyzing this issue within the 
framework of a Computable General Equilibrium model is one of the aims of this paper. 
A second issue is to answer the questions: What are the intertemporal effects of inter-
national capital market imperfection and/or restrictions on international trade in carbon emis-
sion rights on the global climate and regional welfare? Do constraints on "where to abate" 
flexibility affect marginal costs of abatement as well as marginal productivity of capital in the 
same way as restrictions on "where to invest" flexibility or in different ways? By this not only 
the Chichilnisky and Heal (1994) analysis is extended in several respects. A better under-
standing of the results from regional disaggregated impact models such as MERGE and RICE 
is also provided. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the main features of 
the modeling approach upon which the numerical analysis is based. Section 3 presents some 
analytical results, and Section 4 reports the outcome of the numerical calculations based on a 
conventional specification of data inputs. Section 5 obtains results for alternative parameter 
values. Concluding remarks are given in Section 6. Finally, a full description of the model can 
be found in the Appendix. 
 
 
2. Theoretical framework 
 
Since the purpose of our numerical thought experiments is insight and not numbers, the theo-
retical framework is kept deliberately simple. To relate our results to the existing literature, 
some of the basic ideas and numerical parameters from the RICE, MERGE and MEDEA (see 
Stephan and Müller-Fürstenberger, 1998) integrated assessment models are taken over into 
our stylized-facts model of the world economy.1  
 There are only two regions of the world. For vividness let them be called North (N) 
and South (S). North consists of the OECD countries including the former Soviet Union. 
South covers the rest of the world. Each region is represented as though it were an infinite-
lived agent, maximizing the discounted utility of consumption over time (for a discussion, see 
Stephan and Müller-Fürstenberger, 1998). Both North and South employ identical utility dis-
count rates, but South enjoys a higher rate of potential GDP growth than North. This immedi-
ately leads to the possibility of differential rates of return on capital between the two regions. 
 Time is taken as discrete and periods are one decade in length. Among the various 
greenhouse gases, carbon dioxide is considered as the most relevant one. Potential global warm-
ing is caused by increased atmospheric CO2 concentration and directly affects production, but 
not utilities. 
For each time period, there are just two tradable goods: the numeraire and carbon 
emission rights. The numeraire can be produced within each region and may be used for con-
sumption, investment, net exports or carbon abatement. Carbon emission rights are assigned 
exogenously to each region through international negotiations, but these rights may be bought 
and sold so as to achieve economically efficient solutions. 
                                                          
1 A complete list of the model equations can be found in the Appendix. The programming code is available from 
the authors upon request. 
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2.1 Climate-economy interaction 
 
A "two-box" model is used to cumulate carbon emissions over time, and to translate them into 
global concentrations (for a detailed discussion, see Joos et al., 1999). The current stock of 
atmospheric carbon dioxide, Q(t), depends on the former one, Q(t-1), and past period global 
emissions, e(t-1):  
 
(2.1)  Q(t) = Y Q(t-1) + Q e(t-1). 
 
Y  is the factor by which natural abatement processes reduce existing stocks of atmospheric 
CO2. Q  is the fraction of current global emissions that will accumulate in the atmosphere.  
We neglect the thermal inertia lag between global carbon concentration and climate 
change. We also neglect the cooling effects of aerosols and the heating effects of greenhouse 
gases other than carbon dioxide. And we neglect climate externalities that are not valued in a 
market such as species loss for example. What we reflect, however, is that global climate 
change may affect productivity of different regions of the world in different ways.  
Regional externalities of global climate change are represented by a quadratic concentra-
tion-damage function: 
 
(2.2)  F r(t) = 1 - [Q(t)/W r]2. 
 
The regional environmental loss factor F r(t) indicates economic damages induced by global cli-
mate change in region r = N, S. The corresponding economic costs are measured in terms of for-
gone GDP. I.e., if the atmospheric carbon stock is raised to levels Q(t) above pre-industrial at-
mospheric carbon, then the productivity of factors is reduced in region r such that only F r(t) per-
cent of the region potential gross production are still available. W r marks the critical value of at-
mospheric CO2 perturbation at which production in region r = N, S is reduced to zero. 
 
2.2 Production and greenhouse gas abatement 
 
For convenience, let for each region r = N, S the conventionally measured gross output, yr(t), 
without climate effects be a Cobb-Douglas function 
 
(2.3)  y r(t) = brLr(t) a(r) Kr(t) 1-a(r)  
 
of regional labor Lr(t) and capital Kr(t) inputs, respectively. br is a scaling parameter and a(r) 
is the value share of labor.  
 As in RICE we sidestep a detailed energy sub-model by viewing carbon dioxide emis-
sions as a linear function of total regional output. It is supposed that without greenhouse gas 
abatement, sr units carbon dioxide are emitted in region r, if one unit of conventional gross out-
put is produced. Emissions can be reduced, however, by employing abatement activities. There-
fore, region r's instantaneous carbon dioxide emissions, er(t), are given by 
 
(2.4)  er(t) = (1 - ar(t))sryr(t), 
 
where ar(t) denotes the fraction of CO2 emissions abated in period t by region r.  
 This formulation allows to observe directly regional abatement costs mr(t). The latter are 
expressed in units of regional gross output and are supposed to be quadratic in abatement activi-
ties ar(t):  
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(2.5)  mr(t) = t[ar(t)] 2 yr(t). 
 
The scaling factor t is chosen such that complete elimination of CO2 emissions consumes 
twenty percent of the regional gross output. This is quite a pessimistic estimate. Suppose for 
example, that carbon-free backstop technologies were available at marginal costs of US$ 200 
(see Stephan and Müller-Fürstenberger, 1998), then the scaling factor would be only 5 %. Our 
estimate is equivalent to average costs of 800$ US or marginal costs of 1400 $ US for carbon 
free energy. 
 
2.3 International capital market imperfection 
 
Climate change reduces the productivity of the regional economies (see (2.2)). Only the fraction 
F r(t) of conventional gross output yr(t) is at the region’s disposal. ‘Green output’ F r(t)yr(t) can 
be consumed, cr(t), invested into conventional capital formation, ir(t), or used for CO2 abatement, 
mr(t). Regional output is considered as numeraire that can be traded international. Hence, if xr(t) 
denotes the net-exports of region r in period t,  
 
(2.6)  F r(t)yr(t) ³ cr(t) + ir(t) + mr(t) + xr(t) 
 
is the material balance of produced and tradable commodities in region r = N, S. 
 Restricted international mobility of capital as observed empirically might be associ-
ated with imperfect information transfers from one region to another. Alternatively, it could 
also be associated with prospective defaults on the repayment of debts (see Baxter and Jer-
mann, 1997). In this paper we take the last view and consider limits on regional trade deficits 
as source for international immobility of capital (see Section 3). 
 
2.4 Climate policy 
 
There are two types of capital stocks, the society can control. In each region r the accumulation 
of the physical capital stock Kr(t) follows a conventional rule 
 
  Kr(t+1) = (1-ur)Kr(t) + ir(t),  
 
where ur is the region specific capital depreciation rate. 
 The environmental capital stock is determined by the atmospheric accumulation of car-
bon dioxide, hence depends upon the global climate policy. It is supposed that climate policy is 
the outcome of the cooperative solution of the greenhouse gas problem. By this, globally ag-
gregated CO2 emissions, e(t), are determined for each period. Carbon emission rights are as-
signed exogenously to each region through international negotiations. 
 xr(t) denotes the share of global emissions as assigned to region r in period t. This 
means, without trade in carbon rights, region r were allowed to consume xr(t)e(t) units of car-
bon dioxide during period t. With trade region r can either buy carbon emission rights or 
might sell a certain fraction of its endowment. Therefore, if sr(t) denotes net-exports of carbon 
emission rights, the right hand side of 
 
(2.7)  er (t) £ xr(t) e(t) - sr(t) 
 
sets an upper bound on CO2 emissions of region r in period t. 
 Given the characterization of the theoretical approach so far, the most simple way to look 
at the economics of global climate change is to suppose that regions follow a Ramsey path. I.e., 
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if d is the social discount factor, then consumption, production, investment into physical capital 
and greenhouse gas abatement are determined in each region r =N, S, as if a policy maker has 
maximized the discounted sum of the logarithm of consumption cr(t) 
 
(2.8)  Wr = St d-t ln(cr(t)) 
 
for striking an optimal balance between consumption and physical investment. 
 To close the model, two additional conditions have to be added for each period t. 
 
(2.9)  xN (t) + xS (t) = 0 
 
is trade balance for trades in the numeraire. 
 
(2.10)  sN (t) + sS (t) = 0 
 
says that globally exports and imports of carbon rights have to be in balance. 
 
 
3. Analytical considerations 
 
In the following we show analytically that marginal costs of abatement differ across regions, 
if international capital markets are imperfect. 
Marginal costs of abatement, mcar(t), can be calculated from (2.4) and (2.5). This im-
mediately implies 
 
  -¶mr(t)/¶er(t) = -[¶mr(t)/¶ar(t)][¶ar(t)/¶er(t)], 
 
hence 
 
(3.1)  mcar(t) = 2ar(t)t/sr. 
 
Let pN(t) and qN(t) the prices of produced outputs and carbon emission rights, respectively, 
that prevail in the northern hemisphere. Then first order conditions yield (see (2.6) and (2.7)) 
 
(3.2)  pN(t) mcaN(t) = qN(t), 
 
Furthermore, since trade in carbon emission rights as well as in the numeraire have to be in 
balance globally (see (2.9) and (2.10)), we obtain 
 
  qN(t) = q*(t) and pN(t) = p*(t). 
 
q*(t) and p*(t) are the world market prices of carbon rights and the numeraire, respectively. 
Hence, domestic and international prices of the numeraire and carbon coincide, and marginal 
costs of abatement must equal the real price of carbon permits: 
 
(3.3)  mcaN(t) = q*(t)/p*(t). 
 
Now, if there are no limits on international capital mobility, the consideration from above can 
be repeated for the South. Consequently, without market imperfection, marginal costs of 
abatement have to be identical in both regions. 
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But what, if international capital markets are imperfect? What, if the South faces a 
constraint on trade deficits that limits its ability to import foreign capital, as discussed in Sec-
tion 2.3? Formally, limits on southern trade deficits are given through 
 
(3.4)  G(t)p*(t)[F  S(t)yS(t) – mS(t)] ³ [p*(t)xS(t) + q*(t)sS(t)]. 
 
G(t) is the maximum value-ratio of debt financed net-imports to domestic output (less abate-
ment costs). p*(t) and q*(t) are as above the world market prices of the numeraire and carbon 
permits, respectively.  
Exporting carbon permits to the North will yield revenues which can be used to fi-
nance additional imports of the numeraire. Through taking derivatives of (2.7), (2.10), and 
(3.4) with respect to carbon exports, sS(t), first order optimality conditions imply 
 
(3.5)  qS(t) = (1 + n(t))q*(t), 
 
where n(t) is the shadow price of the debt constraint (3.4). Hence, domestic prices of carbon 
are above international carbon prices as long as the debt constraint is binding. One might 
guess, therefore, that marginal costs of abatement should be higher in South than in North. 
However, this is wrong. Marginal costs of abatement are valued in domestic terms of 
the numeraire. To see this, consider the first order conditions after differentiating (2.6), (2.9) 
and (3.4) with respect to net-exports, xS(t), of the numeraire. This immediately shows that 
domestic and international prices interrelated  
 
(3.6)  pS(t) = (1 + n(t))p*(t).  
 
In other words, both regions face the same real price of carbon permits. Debt-relaxation drives 
no wedge between marginal costs of abatement.   
 Exporting carbon permits, however, has a second effect on the debt constraint. Since 
abatement absorbs gross production, it tightens the debt constraint. Thus selling carbon per-
mits not only increases domestic abatement costs but also reduces South’s debt capacity. To 
pin down this effect, (2.6), (2.7), and (3.4) are differentiated with respect to carbon emissions 
eS(t): 
 
(3.7)  mcaS(t) p*(t) [1 + n(t) G(t)]  = q*(t). 
 
The second term in brackets reflects the effect just described above. From (3.3) and (3.7) we 
obtain 
 
(3.8)  mcaS(t) < mcaN(t), 
 
which provides the theoretical underpinning of our result in Section 4.  
 
 
4. Numerical results 
 
4.1 Scenarios 
 
Basically, there are two different ways to look at the global climate problem (see Stephan and 
Müller-Fürstenberger, 1998). One option is to take a descriptive view and relate the global 
climate problem to principles of economic efficiency. This means, the climate problem is 
placed into the framework of a decentralized market economy. Efficient greenhouse gas 
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abatement policies are identified through cost-benefit considerations where the market rate of 
interest is used for evaluating investments both in physical and environmental capital.  
 Alternatively, one could take a prescriptive approach and relate the global climate 
problem to ideas of intergenerational fairness and equity. Current emissions are small com-
pared to the existing stock of atmospheric carbon. Hence, abatement costs are born early and 
benefits do not accrue until the distant future. The lower the rate of discounting, the higher is 
the weight placed upon the well-being of the future generations. It is no surprise therefore that 
intergenerational equity calls for discounting the future climate at rates that are significantly 
below the market rate of interest. 
 Just as in the related literature we take a descriptive view and base our main results the 
assumption that future utilities are discounted at a rate of 3%. This roughly corresponds to 
discounting at the market rate of interest. Since we expect, however, that the discount rate will 
affect the numerical simulations, results are also reported for a prescriptive approach, where 
future utilities are discounted at a rate of 1%. Furthermore, calculations are designed so that 
there could be a substantial reduction of today's North-South per capita income disparities 
during the next century. This is why we suppose that without greenhouse policy North will 
have an average annual GDP growth rate of 1.5% and South will grow at a rate of 3.5%.  
 Given the model formulation (see (2.8)) both regions follow a Ramsey path for strik-
ing an optimal balance between consumption and physical investment. If there were no capital 
mobility and no investment in greenhouse gas abatement, both regions would develop inde-
pendently. Along an optimal growth path, there could be a 4.5% rate of return on capital in 
the North and 6.5% in the South. 
 But what if the regions agree to cooperate on greenhouse abatement, and what if there 
are limited options for capital flows? We examine the outcome - assuming that prices, sup-
plies and demands are generated through a multi-period general equilibrium model. Solutions 
are obtained via Rutherford’s sequential joint maximization method - a specialization of the 
Negishi approach (see Rutherford 1995).  
Based on these considerations, four  policy scenarios are identified (see Table 1): 
 
Policy scenario CMCT CMCNT CRCT CRCNT 
Full capital mobility X X   
International trade of carbon rights X  X  
 
 
Table 1: Classification of policy scenarios 
 
 
CMCT denotes the scenario with greatest flexibility. There is full international capital mobil-
ity, and carbon emission rights are traded on open international markets. CRCT means that 
there are limits on international capital flows but free trade of carbon rights. Unrestricted capi-
tal mobility, but no trade in carbon emission rights at all is identified by CMCNT. Finally, 
CRCNT represents the scenario with lowest flexibility. There are restrictions on international 
capital mobility and there is no international trade of carbon emission rights. If necessary re-
gional effects are identified by adding either N (North) or S (South) in brackets.  
 
4.2 Market imperfection and the global climate 
 
Trading both capital and carbon emission rights on open international markets increases the 
world's "where to abate" as well as "where to invest" flexibility. Without trade restrictions, 
scarce resources, capital and abatement activities can be allocated more efficiently. Conse-
quently, low-cost abatement facilities might be used more extensively, and conventional out-
 9
put should be higher. However, although the world can be richer in terms of conventional 
welfare, it might get purer in environmental quality. Growth in GDP correlates with higher 
carbon emissions (see (2.4)). And it is not clear a priory that the resulting climate effect is 
compensated by extending low-cost abatement.  
As Figure 1 indicates "where to abate" and "where to invest" flexibility affects the 
global climate in quite different ways. Limits on "where to invest" flexibility have only negli-
gible effects on atmospheric carbon concentration. If the future climate is discounted at the 
market rate of interest, then, just as Manne and Stephan (1999) have reported, an invariance 
result is observed. The stock of atmospheric carbon dioxide is virtually independent of the 
degree of international capital mobility. 
This is quite in contrast to the result we observe if we compare global climate policies 
with or without trade in carbon emission rights. As Figure 1 demonstrates, no trade in carbon 
emission rights is a better alternative from an ecological perspective. At the global level it 
causes lower carbon dioxide emissions. This can be explained by two negative effects, a low 
"where to abate" flexibility has on regional GDP. First, the North now must fully reduce car-
bon emissions even at high costs (see Figure 2). Second, South cannot finance expansion of 
its capital stock by selling carbon permits.  
Indeed, without international trade in carbon rights, greenhouse gas abatement is inef-
ficiently allocated. As Figure 3 shows, marginal costs of abatement are then always higher in 
North than in the South. This corresponds to high abatement activities in the North, and al-
most none in the South (see Figure 2 and Figure 2a). On the other hand, if there were full 
"where to abate" flexibility, then through buying emission rights, North can expand its CO2 
emissions at relative low cost. This is reported by Figure 2, which shows that abatement activ-
ity in North declines dramatically in case of carbon trade. Therefore, high "where to abate" 
flexibility directly correlates to low carbon abatement activities in the North. Coinciding, the 
South can generate income through selling carbon emission permits which allows to finance 
capital imports. This creates welfare gains in both regions but leads to a higher atmospheric 
carbon concentration (again see Figure 1). 
Obviously, this result is very much driven by the initial distribution of carbon rights. If 
the South has a high initial endowment (75%) of carbon emission rights, then without trading 
carbon rights on open international markets its optimal strategy will be not to abate at all for 
almost one century. Changing the distribution of carbon rights in favor of North narrows the 
gap between marginal costs of abatement in these two regions. The basic pattern, however, is 
still observed. 
 
4.3 Market imperfection and regional economies 
 
Theory predicts (see Section 3) that in the case of capital market imperfection marginal 
abatement costs are higher in the North than in the South. However, numerically these effects 
are hardly to be recognized at all. What really seems to matter and visually drives the results 
is whether there is trade in carbon emission rights or not. Compared to that the effects of re-
strictions on international capital mobility on global climate are almost negligible. Just the 
opposite is observed, however, if the impact of trade restrictions on marginal productivity of 
capital and per capita consumption are considered (see Figure 4 and Figures 5 and 5a). 
As might be predicted from the model formulation (2.6), differences in regional mar-
ginal productivity of capital will diminish if the international mobility of capital increases. 
Just this outcome is observed in Figure 4. Figure 4 also shows that the marginal productivity 
of capital is independent of the degree of "where to abate" flexibility, at least if the interna-
tional capital markets are perfect. 
If capital markets are perfect, then marginal productivity of capital is identical for both 
regions. Nevertheless, "where-to-abate" flexibility can have some impact on the marginal 
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productivity of capital. Trading carbon emission rights on open international markets reduces 
marginal productivity. An explanation for this observation is given through Figures 1, 2, and 
2a. With carbon trade due to reduced abatement in North that is not fully compensated 
through additional abatement in South global emissions are higher. In other words, the North 
substitutes conventional capital for abatement activity. As a result, the marginal productivity 
of capital declines. 
In a highly stylized model as the one presented here per-capita consumption is a rea-
sonable proxy for welfare. As easily can be recognized from Figure 5, a policy regime that 
would provide both "where to abate" and "where to invest" flexibility were most favorable to 
the North. The worst possible outcome, the North might be confronted with, is observed in the 
(CRCNT) scenario which roughly represents the present state of international climate policy: 
no international trade in carbon emission rights on one hand and capital market incomplete-
ness on the other . In fact, the (CRCNT) path is dominated by the full flexibility (CMCT) sce-
nario over the whole time period.  
Per-capita consumption in South (Figure 5a) does not reveal a clear "worst-case". Free 
trade both in capital and in carbon emission rights improves welfare in terms of per capita-
consumption, but only in the short term. This is mainly due to capital imports which boost 
domestic production. But since these imports are financed by debt, repayment drives down 
domestic consumption afterwards. Therefore, in the very long-run, no flexibility at all proves 
optimal to the South.  
 
 
5. Sensitivity analysis 
 
5.1 Sensitivity with respect to the discount rate 
 
Let us now take a different view of the world. Let us assume that the future is discounted at 
1% which is significantly below the market rate of interest. Will the invariance result still be 
observed which says that capital market imperfection visually does not affect marginal costs 
of abatement and the atmospheric accumulation of carbon?  
Obviously, the answer is no. As can be seen from Figure 6, capital market imperfec-
tion now has an impact on global climate. The growth-dumping effect of capital market im-
perfection causes lower emissions and implies lower stocks of atmospheric carbon. And if we 
compare Figure 1 and Figure 6, two further effects can be identified. First, a lower utility dis-
count rate leads to higher investment into environmental capital. In general carbon accumula-
tion is now remarkable slowed down compared to discounting at the market rate. Second, 
with respect to "where-to-abate" flexibility, in principle same patterns as with 3% utility dis-
counting are observed. 
Finally, regional per-capita consumption is shown in Figures 7 and 7a. With a low dis-
count rate more capital is exported from the North to the South. This explains why - in con-
trast to the 3% case - North now experiences significant losses in per capita consumption at 
the beginning of the time horizon, if there are no limits on international capita mobility. South 
gains from these capital imports relative to the case without "where-to-invest" flexibility. 
However, from the middle of the century onwards repayment of debt renders a free trade sce-
nario inferior to a restricted trade one.  
 
5.2 Sensitivity with respect to other parameters  
 
We find invariance when several of the key parameters are altered. Two examples are shown, 
but others may easily be generated. There is PBAK, a case in which the cost of the futuristic 
carbon-free backstop technology increase such that complete abatement of carbon would con-
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sume 30 % of GDP instead of 20%. And there is CLOME, a case in which  the economic 
costs of climate damages are doubled. 
 Both these variants lead to significant near-term declines in the absolute value of 
global emissions, but did not reveal significant differences in sensitivity among our "where-
to-abate" and "where-to-invest" scenarios. Just for illustrative purposes, we confine ourselves 
to impacts on atmospheric carbon. 
Differences in atmospheric carbon relative to our baseline scenario are shown in Fig-
ure 8. Doubling climate damages initiates more abatement, and by the end of the century car-
bon stocks are about 10% below those in the base case. "Where-to-abate" flexibility affects 
global climate only slightly. With free carbon trade, doubling climate damages has a greater 
impact on atmospheric carbon than without trade.  
 Higher abatement costs should negatively affect on abatement activities, thus must 
lead to atmospheric carbon concentration. Figure 8 shows, that peak levels at 2100 are 5 % 
above those within in our baseline assumption. However, differences according to trade re-
strictions are not recognized. 
 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
 
When we began this study, based on conventional wisdom we anticipated at least three ef-
fects, restriction on international "where-to-abate" and "where-to-invest" flexibility should 
have on the economically efficient rate of global decarbonization, marginal costs of abate-
ment, rates of return on capital, as well as on economic welfare. 
 Our first hypothesis was that capital market imperfection causes different marginal 
costs of abatement and different returns on capital across regions. By way of computational 
experiments and analytical reasoning, this turned out to be true. Capital market imperfection 
spills over to abatement costs. However, differences become only obvious if the world is 
viewed from a prescriptive perspective. If the future is discounted at the market rate, then the 
marginal rates of abatement are virtually independent of the degree of international capital 
market imperfection. 
 A second hypothesis claimed that lowering the discount rate amplifies the impacts of 
capital market imperfections. Again, this turned out to be true. In case of marginal costs of 
abatement, differences across regions occur only in case of low discount rates. We also ob-
served differences in carbon accumulation according to whether where-to-invest applies or 
not. That is, invariance result of Manne and Stephan (1999) does not survive large deviations 
from discounting at market rates. 
Finally, we expected that significant trade restrictions have an impact on economic 
growth and greenhouse policy. With respect to consumption, trade restrictions provide wel-
fare losses mostly to North. Impacts on South’s consumption patterns are more complicated. 
There, trade restrictions harm current generations but improve future generations welfare. The 
resulting conflict between North and South will be subject to future research.  
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Appendix: Algebraic representation of the model 
 
This Appendix provides a complete listing of model variables, parameters, and equations. 
Lagrange-multiplieres are attached in brackets to some of the equations.  
 
 
Variables and Parameters 
 
y r(t) Regional output (GDP) 
Lr(t) Labor input 
Kr(t) Capital input 
F r(t) Green capital factor (0 £ F r(t) £ 1) 
cr(t) Consumption 
ir(t) Investment 
Mr(t)  Abatement costs 
xr(t) Exports of  GDP 
sr(t) Exports of carbon permits 
ar(t) Abatement activity (0 £ ar(t) £ 1) 
pr(t) Domestic price of GDP 
p*(t) World market price of GDP 
qr(t) Domestic price of carbon permits 
q*(t) World market price of carbon permits 
Q(t) Atmospheric carbon 
er(t) Regional carbon emissions 
e(t) World carbon emissions 
mr(t) Abatement costs 
Kr(t) Capital stock 
n(t) Shadow price of the debt constraint 
a(r) Labor value share 
br Production scaling 
lgr Labor growth rate 
ur Capital survival rate 
Y  Long-run decay of atmospheric carbon 
Q  Immediate oceanic uptake of atmospheric carbon 
W r Critical carbon concentration 
xr(t) Initial share in carbon permits 
sr Emission coefficient 
t Abatement cost coefficient 
G(t) Limit on trade deficit 
d Utlitiy discount rate 
 
 
Equations 
 
Gross production 
(A.1)  y r(t) = brLr(t) a(r) Kr(t) 1-a(r)  
 
Material balance 
(A.2)   F r(t)yr(t) ³ cr(t) + ir(t) + mr(t) + xr(t)    [pr(t)] 
 14
 
Labor constraint 
(A.3)  Lr(t) £ (lgr)tLr(0) 
 
Capital accumulation 
(A.4)  Kr(t+1) = urKr(t) + ir(t) 
 
Carbon accumulation 
(A.5)  Q(t) = Y Q(t-1) + Q e(t-1) 
 
Green capital factor 
(A.6)  F r(t) = 1 - [Q(t)/W r]2 
 
Regional carbon constraint 
(A.7)  er (t) £ xr(t) e(t) - sr(t)      [qr(t)] 
 
Regional carbon emissions 
(A.8)  er (t) = sryr(t)[1- ar(t)] 
 
Abatement costs 
(A.9)  mr(t) = t[ar(t)] 2yr(t) 
 
Trade balance for the numeraire 
(A.10)  xN (t) + xS (t) = 0      [p*(t)] 
 
Trade balance for carbon rights 
(A.11)  sN (t) + sS (t) = 0      [q*(t)] 
 
Debt constraint for South 
(A.12)  G(t) p*(t)[ F r(t)yS(t) – mS(t)] ³  -[p*(t)xS(t) +  q*(t)sS(t)] [n(t)] 
 
Regional welfare function 
(A.13)   Wr = St d-t ln(cr(t)). 
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 Figure 2a: Abatement activity
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 Figure 3: Marginal Cost of Abatement
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 Figure 4: Marginal productivity of capital
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 Figure 6: Atmospheric carbon
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